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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years since the rolling contract formation theory developed, there
has been a notable dissonance between the quiet acceptance of the theory by
courts in numerous jurisdictions and the frequent and often severe criticism
it receives from legal commentators. Scholars are often dismissive of the
commercial efficiency rationales courts have applied in adopting the theory;1
viewing such rationales as an imbalanced judicial give-away to corporations
at the expense of consumers.  However, they tend to focus on the view that2
rolling contract theory is an illegal aberration from accepted contractual
formation that leaves consumers to the mercy of an unfair bargaining
disadvantage where they can be forced to accept detrimental terms and
conditions without real knowledge or consent.3
The purpose of this article is to show that in fact rolling contract theory
is quite consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code’s policy supporting
flexibility in contract formation to support the development of commercial
practices. It is not simply a giveaway to sophisticated sellers, but is built in
large part on the expectations of consumers. Moreover, taken in the context
of existing practices, especially standard form contracts, it actually provides
more transactional security to consumers than long-standing alternative
practices. Finally, I will argue that the contractual formalism rationale, by
which critics of rolling contract theory advocate a reversal of the clear judicial
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1. See, e.g., Sajida Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation Under the UCC
and the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts Shipped with Goods,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 403, 403–04 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 696 (2004).
3. See, e.g., William Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1099, 1116–17 (2004).
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trend, is not only inconsistent with the U.C.C., but is at the same time
inadequate, disproportional, and unnecessary to the goal of protecting
consumers from unfair terms. It is inadequate because consumers are still
subject to other types of standard form or adhesion contracts, which in
practice give them less bargaining leverage to protect their interests than
rolling contracts. It is disproportional because it would eliminate the benefits
rolling contracts have provided to millions of consumers in the form of
transactional efficiency and convenience, for the more limited purpose of
preventing bad outcomes in the tiny fraction of contracts that end in dispute.
Finally, it is unnecessary because there are more direct measures available for
protecting consumers from abuse that already exist in the form of judicial
doctrines and regulation.
II. COMMERCIAL PRACTICE AND THE STANDARD FORM CONTRACT
CONTEXT
Critical to understanding the legal and commercial context in which
rolling contract theory developed is the idea of a contract law that is flexible
to the needs and changes of commercial practice, particularly exemplified by
standard form contracts. The essential purpose of standard form contracts is
to bundle legal terms applicable to the sale of a product with the product itself,
such that they are commoditized and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.4
The subject matter of the terms, including choice of law and forum or
arbitration clauses, warranties, remedies, and other customer service policies,
are determined as part of the economic and legal risk elements of the
product’s marketing development. By offering uniform terms, sellers can
streamline their marketing and save tremendously on the agency and
transaction costs that would be associated with individually-negotiated
agreements.  This in turn, allows for wider distribution and easier entry into5
the national market since the terms of sale for a product can be standardized
for mass-markets just as the qualities of the product are.  A consequence of6
these terms is that they are no more negotiated by individual consumers than
the price or quality of the goods, but theoretically, they are subject to the same
competitive forces. If consumers don’t like the terms, they won’t buy the
4. John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
285, 287 (2000).
5. Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Description v.
Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 556 (2005).
6. Burke, supra note 4, at 287.
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goods and the seller will be pressured to either give more favorable terms or
else attract customers with lower prices or higher quality.
An important preliminary issue presented by standard form contracts is
how easily their terms can become a part of a contract. Will terms with results
that clearly favor the seller be enforced even though the buyer is unable to
remove the term through bargaining and may not have a practically realistic
opportunity to read or understand the terms? This was a central issue
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute.
A. Carnival Cruise Lines and Adhesion Contracts
The U.S. Supreme Court in Carnival enforced a forum-selection clause
printed on the back of a cruise ticket.  The plaintiffs in the case had already7
paid for the tickets before receiving them in the mail or viewing the terms
listed on them.  Included in the terms was a clause stating that by accepting8
and using the tickets, the holder agreed to bring any dispute arising from the
cruise in Florida.  Unfortunately, the plaintiffs suffered an injury during the9
cruise and filed suit in their home state of Washington.  Carnival Cruise10
Lines sought to have the forum-selection clause enforced and ultimately
prevailed, with the Court holding that the clause was enforceable even though
the plaintiffs had not read it and may not have had notice of it before
purchasing the tickets because they were still responsible for the terms to
which they legally assented.  Only if the clause was unreasonable would it11
not have been enforced.  The Court determined that because Florida is the12
primary seat of Carnival Cruise Lines, it was a reasonable forum to choose.13
This was true even though the plaintiffs were from Washington and their
cruise departed from California.  The Court reasoned that Carnival had14
legitimate reason for limiting its risk of litigation from any potential forum in
which its customers resided.  Additionally, litigants from both sides would15
7. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 597 (1991).
8. Id. at 587.
9. Id. at 587–88.
10. Id. at 588.
11. Id. at 597.
12. Id. at 593.
13. Id. at 595.
14. Id. at 587–88.
15. Id. at 593.
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save time and expense from pre-trial motions to determine the proper forum.16
Finally, the customers may benefit by reduced fares “reflecting the savings
that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”17
The Court had to balance the practicalities of setting terms and providing
notice to customers against the customers’ reasonable opportunity to bargain
over that term. The Court chose to allow the term even though they were
incorporated without negotiation or bargaining parity on the part of the
customer because of the business context in which the contract was
executed.  Thus, practically speaking, it would be meaningless to make the18
term negotiable, if the buyer has no parity, and it would be senseless to refuse
to enforce a clause in a form ticket just because it was not negotiated so long
as it was assented to.19
The very idea of form contracts is that there is no individualized
bargaining because they are meant to provide “one-size-fits-all contracts”
which promote uniformity of seller policies, therefore reducing agency costs,
while also reducing transaction costs by tying the terms and conditions to the
value of the marketed goods themselves.  Indeed, a great lack of parity20
between the parties is “the norm.”  Because of this, at least one commentator21
has argued that a form contract is “tantamount to a commodity,” where “[t]he
contract is embedded in the product and constitutes part of its identity. The
properties of the contract can no more be changed than the properties of the
product itself, because the contract’s properties, like the product’s, are preset
prior to being offered on the market.”22
Thus, in determining the true interest of the customer with respect to the
reasonableness of the forum selection clause, one should consider the effects
on the cruise ticket market, not the narrow legal effects on the individual sale,
because it is in the market setting that the bargain takes place. This seems to
have been the approach the Court took. It is easy, after all, to have sympathy
for consumers who face difficulty as a result of a forum selection clause in
seeking to make their case. However, this is a hindsight perspective. The vast
majority of passengers do not face litigation, and thus a rational consumer will
choose the cheaper tickets with a low risk of an unfavorable forum selection
16. Id. at 594.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 593.
19. Id.
20. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 679
(2004).
21. Burke, supra note 4, at 293–94.
22. Id. at 287.
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rather than a more expensive ticket with a favorable forum selection clause.
Which is the greater benefit, the reduced prices for the great majority or the
possibility of litigating in a chosen-forum in the rare event of litigation? For
better or worse, the Court chose the same side as the market had and as the
Shutes had when they agreed to Carnival’s terms with its attendant conditions.
III. ROLLING CONTRACTS
Rolling contract formation is in reality a method for forming standard
form contracts. They have in common their origins in commercial practicality.
Moreover, their benefit is visible in the market setting, with individual benefit
deriving from participation in that market. Their most controversial feature is
that they tend to involve payment for and delivery of goods before the buyer
has a chance to view or assent to the standardized terms. However, the
purpose for this is that because the consumer does not negotiate the terms, but
merely chooses to buy or not buy the products with their attached terms, the
buyer should not be delayed in their purchase by an empty formality for
adhering to the standard terms and conditions, but should be able to order and
pay for the goods so as to receive them as quickly as possible. The terms are
sent later with the option of declining to complete the sale indicated by return
of the goods. The option to decline the final purchase may be motivated by
disapproval of the terms and conditions or other factors. In sum, the contract
formation process can be called “rolling” because it rolls along simultaneously
with the purchase and delivery process.
A. The Typical Rolling Contract Situation
The essence of a rolling contract is that in situations to which it can be
applied, terms are enforced as part of a sales contract even though the buyer
does not receive or have a chance to review them until after paying for the
goods. However, it is a challenging legal theory to unpack because courts must
not only understand and correctly apply the legal reasoning, but must also
properly identify the type of situation in which it is relevant. In the following
section, I will draw from a number of rolling contract cases to suggest four
factors which have tended to trigger rolling contract analysis and may serve
to identify a typical situation to which rolling contract analysis should apply.
Then, I will synthesize the legal reasoning of these cases as they have applied
to those factors with the result of enforcement of the disputed contract
provisions.
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The factors that characterize a rolling contract situation include first, that
the buyer should have been aware of or should have reasonably expected at
the time of purchase that the sale would be subject to more terms than were
specifically available at that time. Second, the additional terms should be
unconditional, which is to say that the seller should only be willing to
complete the sale upon acceptance of those terms. Third, the buyer should
have opportunity to read and consider, and either accept or reject those terms
before finalizing or canceling the sale. Finally, the buyer should have the
opportunity to return the goods and have payment returned should she reject
the terms.
1. The Buyer Should Reasonably Expect Terms Additional to Those
Available at Time of Purchase
The Seventh Circuit’s ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg gives perhaps the
clearest example of a case in which the buyer had notice at the time of sale
that the contract would include terms beyond whatever may be said to have
existed at the time of purchase. Matthew Zeidenberg selected software off of
the shelf of a retailer, which included written notice on the outside of the box
indicating that the purchase would be subject to a license agreement.  Here,23
there was no dispute as to whether Zeidenberg was aware of the license
agreement; he simply did not comply with its terms, believing that they were
not binding.24
Not long after the ProCD decision, the Seventh Circuit indicated in Hill
v. Gateway 2000, Inc. that a rolling contract situation could exist even where
it was not clear that the buyers actually knew additional terms were
forthcoming, so long as they should have known. Judge Easterbrook states that
“the Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would
include some important terms . . . .”  He does not explain directly how it was25
determined that they knew this, but describes from the evidence that Gateway
advertises warranties and lifetime support services, which a reasonable
shopper would expect to have detailed as part of any purchase agreement.26
Thus, it seems, rolling contract analysis could apply where under the
23. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. Darren C. Baker, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation,
and Notions of Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 379, 380
(1997).
25. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
26. Id.
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circumstances, the buyer should have expected that additional detailed terms
would arrive in accordance with expectations of what would be part of the
seller’s obligations.
This view was accepted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, which stated
that terms could be enforced even though plaintiffs do not receive them until
after placing an order if the “language and circumstances” are such that the
contract including those terms is not formed until after the order is placed.27
The Court did not, however, have sufficient evidence to conclude whether or
not the language or circumstances indicated a rolling contract and remanded
on that basis.28
This view was also adopted by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which
more explicitly stated that a reasonable consumer, in the specific case of a
telephone order, would not expect or want to hear every term read over the
phone so that all terms could be assented to at point of purchase.  But at the29
same time, a reasonable consumer would not believe that absent those terms,
the contract has been concluded.  The Court concludes, “[r]ather, [the30
consumer] is aware that with delivery comes a multitude of standard terms
attendant to nearly every consumer transaction.”  Thus, the court is even31
willing to presume that in a typical consumer transaction such as the one
disputed, where reasonable practice would indicate that the terms would be
more effectively communicated after the time of purchase, the contract will
not form at the time of purchase, but after the consumer has received and had
a chance to accept or refuse the terms.32
The Supreme Court of Kansas appears to have taken a different approach
in Wachter Management Company v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., but factual
distinctions explain this difference. The Court held that a software “shrink-
wrap” license was not enforceable as part of the contract where the buyer was
not aware at the time of signing the agreement that any additional license
terms would be involved.  Distinctions in the facts of this case include that33
it was a business to business agreement that was developed “[a]fter detailed
negotiations.”  Further, the contract was not said to form through the34
exchange of money for a promise, such as a typical consumer purchase, but
27. Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 832 (Okla. 2005).
28. Id. at 834.




33. Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 749, 755 (Kan. 2006).
34. Id. at 749.
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was formed by the exchange and signing of forms.  Thus the kinds of35
reasonable behavior and expectation that might be inferred from a typical
standard form transaction will not apply to a closely negotiated agreement.
Therefore, although the outcome is different, the reasoning, which relies on
the language and circumstances, is parallel to prior rolling contract cases.
2. Acceptance of Additional Terms Should Be an Unconditional Element of
Acceptance of the Agreement
It is axiomatic that if acceptance of a contract depends upon acceptance
of additional terms, there should be some indication with regard to those terms
that if they are rejected, the entire agreement will be also. This proposition is
supported in case law applying rolling contract analysis. In ProCD, the court
refers to the very clear terms on the software box, which indicate restrictions
and a license that apply to the software.  Moreover, the CD-ROM is36
programed with a copy of the license, is accompanied by a manual containing
the license and every time the program runs, it displays the license.  This37
license includes restrictions on how the program may be used.  Thus,38
acceptance of the license is unambiguously required as a condition of
purchasing and using the software.
The court in Hill also clearly indicates that the terms that arrived with the
computer would govern “unless the customer returns the computer within 30
days.”  The court in Brower cited these same terms.  Even the court in39 40
DeFontes, though ultimately refusing to enforce the terms as part of the
agreement on separate grounds, noted that the language of the terms “certainly
informed [buyers] that [the seller] intended to bind them to heretofore
undisclosed terms and conditions . . . .”41
A case that exemplifies a court refusing to include a purported set of
additional terms on these grounds, however, is Sprecht v. Netscape
Communications Corp. There, the buyer had downloaded free software from
Netscape and was alleged to have accepted an arbitration clause as part of an
attached license agreement.  Because the software download was free and42
35. Id.
36. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
40. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
41. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071.
42. Sprecht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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entirely electronic, there was some question as to whether Article 2 of the
U.C.C. even applied.  The court determined that it did, reasoning that the43
parties had essentially the same relationship as in a typical standard-form,
buyer-seller contract.  But the court also noted that in this case “the user need44
not view any license agreement terms or even any reference to a license
agreement, and need not do anything to manifest assent to such a license
agreement” in order to download the software.  In fact, the visitors were only45
“invited” to review and agree to the license material, but by the language of
the license were not required to accept.  Thus, absent an indication that the46
terms must become part of the agreement, the buyer was not required to accept
the additional terms in order to accept the contract. For this reason, the
additional terms were not included in the contract, however, by the same
reasoning, it appears that had acceptance of the terms been mandatory, they
would have been included.
3. The Buyer Should Have an Adequate Opportunity to Accept or Reject the
Additional Terms
This factor, much as the one requiring at least reasonable awareness of
additional terms, can pose challenges of factual interpretation distinguishing
a situation in which the buyer clearly knew of the possibility and means of
rejection from a situation in which the buyer never knew of such opportunity
but should have under the circumstances. As we have seen, the buyer in
ProCD was given notice that by using the purchased software he would accept
the terms of the license, but chose to use it anyway, believing the terms were
not enforceable.  Likewise, the buyer in Hill was aware of the statement of47
additional terms, which clearly explained that the terms could be rejected by
returning the goods within thirty days.  The court in Brower was not clear as48
to whether the buyer had actual knowledge of the additional terms, but noted
that the language stating acceptance of the terms if the computer is not
returned in thirty days is clearly present and applicable.  The specific clause49
43. Id. at 591.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 595.
46. Id. at 588.
47. Baker, supra note 24, at 383–484.
48. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
49. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248. 
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at issue was ultimately not enforced, but that was due to unconscionability,
not a holding that the additional terms were not part of the contract.50
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that disputed
additional conditions were not part of the contract between the buyer and
seller, stating, “[i]n reviewing the language of the terms and conditions
agreement it cannot be said that it was reasonably apparent to the plaintiffs
that they could reject the terms simply by returning the goods.”  Thus, even51
if the additional terms are adequately delivered, if the buyer is not given
adequate notice that the terms may be rejected, they will not be included as
part of the contract. This compels the seller to ensure the buyer reasonably
expresses assent by keeping the goods, or otherwise acting to accept the terms
in accordance with the contract.
4. The Buyer Should Be Able to Reject the Additional Terms and Be
Refunded the Sale Price
It is clear in the Seventh Circuit cases that the buyers were entitled to a
refund had they rejected the goods. In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook observes “a
right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable.”  He52
does not specifically mention the right to a refund on return as a point in
dictum in Hill, however, given the reliance of this decision on ProCD
generally and the description of the payment as a means of expediting the
contract performance alongside its formation, it is difficult to imagine why
Gateway could ever be entitled to payment for a contract that was never
concluded.53
In fact, a later case from the Northern District of Illinois reached the same
conclusion, stating, “the customer could return the product without penalty.”54
Notably, the buyer in this case never claimed that the clause at dispute was not
part of the contract.  Nevertheless, the court suggested that because the terms55
made it appear that a return would not result in a full refund, it probably
would not have provided the buyer an adequate chance to reject the terms.56
Consequently, rejection of the terms would not actually result in cancellation
50. Id. at 254.
51. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1073.
52. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
53. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
54. Trujillo v. Apple Computer, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 979, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
55. Id. at 981.
56. Id. at 993.
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of the performance requirements of the buyer, suggesting that the contract had
been formed before the addition of the later terms. If this were true, there
could certainly be no rolling contract.
B. Legal Support for Rolling Contract Formation
Having evaluated the factors of a typical situation in which a rolling
contract is concluded, an explication of the legal reasoning supporting the
finding of a rolling contract is more forthcoming. It must be emphasized from
the outset that rolling contract theory is not about adding terms to an existing
contract, but is about forming a single contract in a rolling process so that a
standardized transaction can be made more efficient by synchronizing
significant performance aspects with the formation of the agreement itself.
The reader will recall, for example, the statement of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma that “[i]f the language and circumstances were such that when the
orders were placed, the contracts were not formed until after the plaintiffs
received the ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’ document, the [disputed terms]
would be a term of the contracts.”  Thus, the issue is not whether the disputed57
terms will be added to an existing contract, but whether a contract in fact did
form at point of purchase, or if it was only concluded after the incorporation
of the “Terms and Conditions of Sale.”
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit regarding this issue is the same. In
Hill, Judge Easterbrook observed,
[t]he question in ProCD was not whether terms were added to a contract after its
formation, but how and when the contract was formed-in [sic] particular, whether a
vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed . . . with money or a general ‘send
me the product,’ but after the customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the
terms.58
The New York appellate court in Brower agrees, noting:
[I]n such transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the placement of the order
or even upon the receipt of the goods. By the terms of the Agreement of issue, it is only
after the consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise for more than 30
days—within which the consumer has presumably examined and even used the
product(s) and read the agreement—that the contract has been effectuated.59
57. Rogers, 138 P.3d at 832.
58. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
59. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 251.
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If the means of contract formation, therefore, are clear, what does Article 2 of
the U.C.C. say about the ability of the parties to form a contract in this way?
1. U.C.C. Article 2-204 Offers Flexibility in the Means of Contract
Formation
The U.C.C. recognizes that “[a] contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”  This flexibility, of60
course, means that varying interpretations of similar facts may result in
diverging findings as to whether and how the contract was formed. Thus, the
court in ProCD allowed the seller, which it viewed as “master of the offer” to
invite acceptance by the conduct of keeping and using the goods, which
acceptance included acceptance of the user restriction terms.  In contrast, the61
U.S. District Court of Kansas found sufficient agreement for a sales contract
from the payment for and reception of a computer on the part of the buyer.”62
It found so by adopting the same reasoning from Step-Saver Data Systems,
Inc. v. Wyse Technology.  In that Third Circuit case, the court saw “no need63
to parse the parties’s [sic] various actions to decide exactly when the parties
formed a contract. [Seller] has shipped the product, and [buyer] has accepted
and paid . . . . The parties’s [sic] performance demonstrates the existence of
a contract.”  Indeed, even though rolling contract formation all but requires64
knowledge of when the contract is formed, the court in Step-Saver was correct
under Article 2-204 of the U.C.C., which states that “[a]n agreement sufficient
to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its
making is undetermined.”  Further, it provides that “[e]ven though one or65
more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if
the parties have intended to make a contract . . . .”  Thus, Judge Easterbrook’s66
supposition that the contract between the Hills and Gateway would be “terms-
free” absent the inclusion of Gateway’s additional terms appears to be false.67
In sum, the default provisions of the U.C.C. would clearly apply absent terms
60. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1962).
61. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
62. Klocek v. Gateway Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337 (D. Kan. 2000).
63. Id.
64. Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991).
65. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1962).
66. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1962).
67. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
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agreed to by the parties varying their effect.  This could include, for instance,68
the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose.69
Although § 2-204 allows finding of a contract even by conduct, even if
it is not clear when the contract formed and even though terms are still
missing, it does not require that a contract be found simply because two
parties’ conduct suggests the possibility of one. The official comments to
§ 2-204 make clear that the decisive issue is what the parties actually agreed,
which may involve consideration of all of the circumstances of the
transaction.  The challenge facing courts in these cases therefore, is that they70
must find the agreement first and determine its objective meaning, usually by
inferring from the parties’ conduct under the circumstances, before they can
find whether a contract has been formed and how. What should guide them in
these inferences? One important factor is the mandate to interpret the U.C.C.
according to its purposes and policies, which include “[permitting] the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties.”  Thus, finding the intent reflected by the conduct71
of the parties in a rolling contract situation would not be left to a guess as to
the subjective expectation of the parties at the time of purchase, but would
include consideration of what that intent reasonably would have been in light
of the commercial practice in which they were engaged. Furthermore, the
policy allowing new commercial practices allows such interpretation in the
context of practices that did not exist when the U.C.C. was drafted or had not
previously been recognized in case law.
In Klocek, the Federal District Court of Kansas criticized Judge
Easterbrook’s finding in ProCD that the vendor is the master of the offer,
noting that “[i]n typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror,
and the vendor is the offeree.”  This was significant as a legal matter, because72
Judge Easterbrook had relied on a finding that the vendor was the master of
the offer to conclude that ProCD was able to invite acceptance by its rolling
contract process, rather than by accepting money in exchange for delivery.73
Of course, U.C.C. § 2-204 does not require finding who is the offeror and
offeree to determine whether a contract is made, but if there is such evidence,
68. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2001).
69. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1962).
70. U.C.C. § 2-204 cmts. (1962).
71. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2001).
72. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
73. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
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it will help to determine whether and how the parties intended to form a
contract.  The court in Klocek rejected the vendor-as-offeror because it found74
no factual evidence that Gateway was the offeror in its contract with Klocek.75
The court indicates that to find that the vendor was the offeror, it would have
had to have given a price quote with the reasonable appearance that assent to
the quote would form a contract.  This reasoning is clearly couched in the76
traditional commercial practice of an over-the-counter purchase, but it does
not reflect the commercial reality of the rolling contract situation at issue.
Judge Easterbrook more satisfactorily incorporates the commercial
practice between the buyer and seller in ProCD and Hill in determining that
the vendor is the offeror, but he is unfortunately not very clear in explaining
why this is so.  The reasoning is easier to see in ProCD. The buyer bought77
the software in a box at the store that had notice on the box that the purchase
would be subject to a user license.  If the seller sets out the terms by which78
the buyer may purchase the product and that the seller’s terms must be
accepted before the agreement will be concluded, then it is fairly clear that the
seller is the offeror. The seller expressly excludes the possibility that payment
alone is sufficient to complete the sale. Further, the terms included clearly
“manifest willingness to enter a bargain” and invite the buyer to assent to the
terms so as to conclude the bargain, in conformance with the definition of an
offer in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  The seller, as maker of that79
offer is the offeror.
This reasoning is more difficult to discern in Hill. The buyers did not
receive the terms before the time of purchase, nor do the facts show that they
were given formal indication that terms were forthcoming, as in ProCD,
which would have to be accepted in order to accept the contract. Nevertheless,
Judge Easterbrook concludes that the buyers were aware that their purchase
would be subject to further terms.  He refers to Gateway advertisements80
about warranties and support services that accompany the computer,  and81
indicates that the Hills actually invoked those warranties earlier in their
dispute process.  Finally, though the Hills did not receive these terms before82
74. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1962).
75. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
76. Id.
77. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
78. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24.
80. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1149.
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submitting payment, this was because they placed their order over the phone,
and it would have been impractical to include all of the terms before
payment.  Even still, shouldn’t the Hills have received notice that additional83
terms would be part of the purchase? Arguably they did have notice. U.C.C.
§ 1-202 provides that “a person has ‘notice’ of a fact if the person:
(1) has actual knowledge of it;
(2) has received a notice or notification of it; or
(3) from all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time
in question, has reason to know that it exists.”84
The Hills may not have had actual knowledge that there would be terms in
addition to what was discussed over the phone, nor do they seem to have
received notice, such as the box message in ProCD, but Judge Easterbrook
found that under the circumstances they had reason to know additional terms
would be forthcoming. Otherwise, they could not receive the warranty and
service protection they expected. Ultimately, then, the Hills knew or should
have known that their purchase could only be finalized by accepting
forthcoming terms from the seller. Judge Easterbrook reasoned that this was
because the seller was the offeror and made acceptance conditional on
acceptance of the additional terms.  This view is problematic because the85
Hills may not have been expressly aware that there would be additional terms
assent to which would be required to enter the contract. However, at the very
least, given the circumstances, they should have been aware that their payment
alone did not conclude the contract.
It is very often the case, as the court in Klocek observes, that contracts are
formed by over-the-counter exchange of payment for goods in perfect
accordance with U.C.C. § 2-204.  However, such accordance does not come86
from the form of the transaction or its traditional acceptance, but from the
sensibility of such a conclusion in light of the commercial practice involved.
Regardless of who is the offeror or offeree, the particular nature of the
transaction in Hill, and similar cases, justifies a different analysis of whether
a contract is formed at payment. When products being sold are sophisticated,
such as computers, software, satellite dish equipment and other technical
goods, they tend to be accompanied by detailed warranty and service
provisions.  Yet it may be impractical and inconvenient to the buyer and87
83. Id.
84. U.C.C. § 1-202(a) (2001).
85. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
86. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
87. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149–50.
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seller to include all of these terms at the point of purchase.  Further, given the88
scale of marketing involved in the sale of computers and software, it is
reasonable to assume that sellers will offer uniform terms to all purchasers,
without individual negotiation, to promote efficiency and standard policies.89
Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable for the buyer to believe the
contract is concluded by payment alone, when these additional terms have yet
to be received or assented to.90
Thus, where U.C.C. § 2-204 provides broad flexibility in the means of
contract formation, that in principle could support finding a sale contract at
time of order, payment, delivery, or after receipt of and assent to terms, it is
the reasonable expectation of the parties under the circumstances that
determines whether a contract has formed, not the mere possibility that a
contract was formed. The reasonable intent of the parties can be determined
by inference from their conduct in light of commercial practice, even if that
practice is new. The commercial realities and practice that accompany rolling
contract situations strongly suggest that it would be unreasonable to infer that
the seller intended to be bound at time of payment or that the buyer expected
to be bound. This is particularly true in situations, like ProCD, where the
seller is the master of the offer and clearly indicates that neither payment nor
acceptance of delivery is sufficient to accept the sale offer.
2. The Circumstances of Rolling Contracts Unambiguously Exclude Default
Provisions of U.C.C. § 2-206
The same circumstances which indicate that the contract is formed by
assent on the part of the buyer to the seller’s terms in rolling contract
situations, rather than at payment or delivery of the goods, also indicate that
arguments that U.C.C. § 2-206 precludes rolling contract formation  are91
incorrect.  First, the circumstances of a rolling contract situation often92
88. Id. at 1149.
89. Gillette, supra note 20, at 679–80.
90. DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071.
91. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 2, at 649–50.
92. U.C.C. § 2-206 (1962) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any
medium reasonable under the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting
acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming
or non-conforming goods. . . .
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unambiguously indicate that acceptance is not invited “in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances.”  In a situation like ProCD,93
where the buyer clearly has notice that acceptance of additional terms are
requisite to conclusion of the contract, the situation is unambiguous that the
buyer may only accept the offer by acceptance of the terms.  In a situation94
like that in Hill, even if the circumstances are considered ambiguous as to
whether any reasonable means of acceptance are available, it would be
unreasonable to believe that payment or delivery alone are reasonable means
of acceptance because those means do not include assent to the forthcoming
terms, which the reader will recall, should be expected to be an unconditional
part of the agreement.  So long as the seller is considered the offeror,95
therefore, acceptance of the terms is unambiguously required to accept the
contract, such that any means short of that would either be ineffective or
unreasonable under § 2-206(1)(a).
Even if the buyer were the offeror, however, so as to implicate
§2-206(1)(b), the circumstances of a rolling contract situation unambiguously
indicate that “an order or offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment”
does not invite acceptance by promise to ship or prompt shipment.  Recall,96
for example, that in Hill the buyers not only expected additional terms with
respect to warranties and support services, they actually invoked them early
in their dispute with Gateway.  This clearly indicates their intent that the97
contract not be formed until after receiving and assenting to those terms. It
would be unreasonable to assert that they both invited acceptance of a contract
without those terms by shipment of the goods, and yet expected those terms
to be a binding part of the contract. Thus, in a rolling contract situation,
because both parties expect that terms in addition to those known or assented
to at time of payment or delivery will be a part of the contract, the
circumstances unambiguously indicate that no acceptance which results in the
exclusion of those terms will have effect, nor would any such acceptance be
reasonable.
93. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1962).
94. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
95. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
96. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1962).
97. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
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3. U.C.C. § 2-207 Is Not Applicable to Rolling Contract Situations
Discussion of § 2-207 is at the eye of the storm in the controversy
surrounding rolling contract formation. It seems clear that application of
§ 2-207 would result in exclusion of terms received after payment in most
rolling contract situations, and would essentially destroy the effectiveness of
the transaction.  Additionally, scholars easily point out the obvious error in98
Judge Easterbrook’s reason for rejecting application of § 2-207, with the
effect of avoiding this outcome.  Justice Easterbrook argued in both ProCD99
and again in Hill that § 2-207 was not relevant because it referred to “battle
of the form” situations, when in these cases, there was only one form; the
terms sent by the seller.  In fact, § 2-207 could easily involve one form. For100
example, suppose a non-merchant buyer and merchant-seller agreed over the
phone to a sale. The seller sends a confirmation of the agreement with terms
in addition to those agreed upon, but the buyer disregards that form, and both
parties otherwise perform their obligations. Under these facts, the
confirmation will operate as acceptance of the telephone agreement and
conclude it as a contract, since acceptance is not expressly made conditional
on assent to the additional or different terms.  Because the buyer is not a101
merchant, the new terms are only “proposals for addition to the contract.”102
The failure of the buyer to accept those terms and the subsequent performance
confirms that the additional terms do not become part of the original contract,
so that the terms are excluded.103
This example is designed to parallel a rolling-contract situation in many
respects, particularly the fact pattern in Hill.  However, there are key104
differences, which indicate that Judge Easterbrook was correct in result, if not
rationale, with respect to the applicability of §2-207. Under the facts and
circumstances of a rolling contract, the additional terms are neither sent as
expressions of acceptance nor confirmation of an agreement.  On the105
98. The analysis in Klocek does particularly well in describing how § 2-207 would apply to rolling
contracts.
99. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 753 (2002).
Professor Hillman nevertheless supported rolling contracts under an interesting, if questionable, alternative
theory.
100. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452; Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
101. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1962).
102. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1962).
103. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1962).
104. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
105. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1962).
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contrary, the reader will recall that the terms are in fact part of the offer.106
Thus there is no basis in § 2-207 for concluding that the terms should operate
as acceptance.  As such, there is no contract to which the terms could be107
proposed additions.  In fact, the terms are part of an ongoing negotiation, to108
which § 2-207 clearly does not apply.
It is understandable that a rolling contract process is difficult to explain
in terms of the traditional narrative forms of legal analysis. Since when are
contracts performed before they are formed? Judge Easterbrook offers a
rhetorical answer to this question by citing examples of common transactions
that involve payment and delivery for the product before the contract is fully
formed.  But these examples are somewhat beside the point. Rolling contract109
formation did not develop and was not accepted because it fits a simple,
traditional legal paradigm, but because it reflects a commercially sensible
approach to a type of sale that has become a common experience in our
society and brings benefits to sellers and buyers alike.  Under the express110
policy of the U.C.C., to require that commercial practice follow traditional
legal paradigms would put the cart before the horse. Article 1-103 requires
construction of the U.C.C. “to permit the continued expansion of commercial
practices,” not rejection of new practices because they don’t comply with
traditional applications of U.C.C. provisions.  To be sure, the commercial111
practices must fit within the “liberally construed” provisions of the U.C.C. But
the cases that have adopted rolling contract formation have demonstrated that
the practice is consistent with those provisions.
IV. FORMALISTIC PRECLUSION OF ROLLING FORMATION WILL HARM
CONSUMERS MORE THAN PROTECT THEM
Preclusion of rolling formation is inadequate to protect consumers
because rolling-formation is but one method of formation. The long accepted
standard form contract allows sellers to include any term they might include
in a rolling contract. The only difference is how the transaction works. In a
telephone sale, short of reading the terms over the phone,  the seller could112
106. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)).
107. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1962).
108. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1962).
109. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
110. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
111. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) (2001).
112. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149 (as Judge Easterbrook facetiously suggested).
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collect the buyer’s relevant information, mail the terms and conditions to the
buyer and await the buyer’s assent before putting in the order and shipping the
goods. The buyer is no more likely to read or understand all of the terms, but
is more likely to be irritated by the seemingly needless delay and paper work
necessary to get the goods. An online sale could certainly be faster. Before
placing the order, the buyer could be required to check a “click-wrap
agreement” which includes all of the seller’s terms. But the buyer seems less
likely than ever to read or understand the terms in this situation. Thus, this
formality would hardly protect consumers in practice.
The better approach, however imperfect, is to use existing tools to protect
consumers from unreasonable outcomes where the market is inadequate to
address their vulnerability. Consumers may be protected by the judicial
doctrine of unconscionability, which will void terms to which a reasonable
consumer would not have knowingly assented and which causes undue
hardship or surprise.  Additional judicially enforced public policy may be113
applied as well, including unenforceability of arbitration clauses that preclude
class-action suits.  Finally, state and federal laws and regulations may be114
passed to protect consumers. These measures, although often seemingly
inadequate in practice, are better than preclusion of an entire means of
bargaining because they specifically address consumer vulnerabilities without
disproportionately precluding the benefits that bargaining may provide to
buyers and sellers.
V. CONCLUSION
As with standard form contracts, there are many latent dangers involved
when contracting is commoditized to allow for mass-marketing. These
agreements involve difficult trade-offs in risk-allocation, such as the
allowance of arbitration-clauses to promote easier national-market entry and
lower prices even if individuals who later want to litigate in court will find
that they have waived their right to do so. The lower scrutiny standard form
contracts receive also results in a higher potential for sophisticated companies
to bind consumers to disproportionate terms. But, they also allow for sellers
to structure their transactions in a way that is more responsive to marketing
efficiency and consumer convenience. Any time a transaction involves
113. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway, 246 A.2d 246 (N.Y.A.D. 1998). This is a famous example where
the court actually refused to enforce an arbitration clause solely on grounds of substantive
unconscionability, rather than also requiring procedural unconscionability.
114. See, e.g., Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).
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delicate balances such as these, it is unwise to place threshold barriers to the
way buyers and sellers can negotiate them because the perceived risks
prevented are likely to be matched by benefits prevented. This is why the
approach to contract formation in the U.C.C. embraced flexibility and
deference to “the expansion of commercial practices.”115
In light of U.C.C. policies and the clear benefits rolling-contract
formation has provided to consumers, many courts have embraced them.
There is good reason for considering consumer protection in these kinds of
transactions, and judges have an important role to play. But reverting to
formalism in contract formation is as likely to harm consumers as to help
them. For this reason, courts should be cautious in their interpretation of
transactions, to be sure that parties are able to get the contract they bargain for
during the transaction, not in light of preventing particular bad outcomes.
Moreover, legal scholars should focus more on how to protect consumers in
the context of efficient transactions rather than precluding transactional
methodologies merely because they may pose dangers.
115. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) (2001).
